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To Keep Water, Water: How We Missed the Mark with
C6te d'Ivoire's Warehoused Refugees
"Water becomes saliva when it remains in the mouth too long."
-A Krahn Proverb1
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I. Introduction
A severe crisis exists in the international community regarding
refugees displaced from their homeland, but remain in foreign
countries for decades at a time. While trying to stay safe abroad,
these refugees-whether they depart their homelands in a mass
exodus or all alone-are guaranteed specific rights under
international law. Signatory nations to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees 2 agreed to grant specific rights to
refugees allowed asylum in their countries. However, adherence
to these treaties is not the norm. International law is falling short
of protecting refugees' rights since the protection granted is only
as strong as the signatory country's own domestic law. Thus, if
the domestic law of any particular host country provides the
refugee the rights established in the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol, then the refugee can be well protected. However, if the
host country never integrates its international obligations into its
own domestic law, then refugees can lose every right they should
be guaranteed under international law. Additionally, even if a
country integrates international obligations into its domestic law-
creating a stronger base on which to build refugee rights-the
popular opinion of the country's citizens can sometimes rob
refugees of rights in the practical setting of day-to-day life. This
paper seeks to examine refugee protection in conjunction with a
very unusual signatory nation, C6te d'Ivoire.
First, the paper considers the general problem of protracted
refugee situations. Second, it closely examines the rights
guaranteed to every refugee under the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol. Third, the paper considers the story of C6te d'Ivoire in
terms of its history and domestic law, and its move from a model
refugee host country to a place where refugees' rights have been
2 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
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largely taken away.
This paper considers the lessons to be learned regarding C6te
d'Ivoire and examines the response from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), beginning with C6te
d'Ivoire's refugee crisis in 1989 and continuing to the present
time. It specifically considers what the UNHCR might have done
differently in the beginning of the refugee crisis in order to
promote long-term protection of refugee rights. The paper also
asks questions regarding the effectiveness of international law,
generally, and the 1951 Convention, specifically. Finally, the
paper considers routes the global community might consider in
order to protect refugees even when donor agencies, host
countries, and international law fail.
II. What is "Warehousing?"
This section considers the new term "warehousing" recently
coined by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in their World
Refugee Survey for 2004.' Phraseology is important because it
can shed new light on old problems and create fresh insight into
the reasons for such problems. Similar exposure occurred
regarding the land mine crisis in 1991 from efforts like the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines.4 The U.S. Committee
for Refugees, by establishing a new term and drawing attention to
the refugee crisis, hopes to achieve the same awareness.5
This section defines the problems of protracted refugee
situations. It presents statistical data to reinforce the magnitude of
the crisis, and then moves on to look at solutions to any protracted
refugee situation.
A. The Problem of Warehousing
"You said that you wanted to put us on a reservation, to build us
houses and make us medicine lodges. I was born where there
were no enclosures and everything drew a free breath. I want to
die there and not within walls."
-Ten Bears speaking for the Comanche at the Council of
3 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2004 21 (2004).
4 See id.
5 See id.
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Medicine in 18676
There is a new term in the lexicon of international human
rights law.7 It brings to mind images of cavernous spaces. To say
it, you almost breathe in the smell of sawdust or items which will
make something on some future day. The term dredges up notions
of objects on shelves which have been stockpiled for future use. It
is a place you might visit hurriedly and then leave as quickly
because it is dark and cold in winter, and it is hot and dank in
summer. If necessity forces you there, you only make the required
trip for retrieval, drop-off, or maintenance, but you never plan to
stay. This place is a warehouse. Its new usage in international
human rights law does not refer to a building sitting in the back of
a manufacturing plant. Instead, it is made anew in order to refer to
a practice that resembles all the ordinary visions that one might
conjure up when thinking of a physical building. In its new
context, "warehousing" describes more of a process than anything
else. Specifically, to "warehouse" is to confine refugees in camps
or segregated settlements for decades.8  The warehousing of
refugees is illegal and is a direct violation of the refugee rights
enshrined in international law,9 and yet, seven million people are
currently warehoused.1° They are figuratively set on a shelf and
put aside for some future and far-off purpose in a dark place where
no one wishes to visit.
There are twelve million refugees in the world.1 Of that
number, more than seven million of them have been confined in
refugee camps or segregated settlements for at least ten years;12
moreover, some of these refugees have been confined to camps for
as long as fifty-five years. 3 While the primary law regarding
6 Chief Ten Bears, Comanche Speech at Medicine Lodge Creek Council of
Medicine (Oct. 19, 1867), http://www.comanchelodge.com/speech.htm.
7 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 18.
8 See id.
9 See 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 2.
10 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 18.
11 See id. at 38.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 3 (tbl.3). As of December 31, 2003, there were 1,600,000 Palestinians
warehoused in the West Bank and Gaza. It has been 55 years since their outflow began.
See id.
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refugees, the 1951 Convention,14 does not mention the word
"camp," the practice of warehousing refugees in camps has been
consistently repeated since the 1930s. 15 At that time, it became the
norm to confine refugees to camps while they awaited deportation
back to their homelands. 16 This waiting game, in its most altruistic
form, could be seen as the only way to adequately protect
refugees' 1951 Convention rights while the refugees await durable
solutions.17 However, the very practice of confinement is what is
robbing them of their rights and often threatening their lives. 8
Indeed, in the fifty-three years since the enactment of the UN
Refugee Convention, warehousing has become so widespread as
to constitute a global crisis. More than two-thirds of the planet's
twelve million refugees are denied the right to earn a livelihood,
access to education, the freedom to move about, or the right to
step into a courtroom and seek justice when they are wronged-
all of which are guaranteed under the Convention.' 9
A refugee is a person who "demonstrates 'a well-founded fear
of persecution' in his or her homeland, based on race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion., 20 An encamped refugee is one who, along with a large
group of others, has typically fled major struggles in hopes of
seeking shelter in a safe place.2' "I left Sudan because of the war.
Everyone was a target. The only option was to leave the country
hoping to go to a safer place," said Abraham Awolich, a refugee
encamped in Kenya after fleeing Sudan.22 Refugees may travel
just across a border or may walk for months at a time seeking a
safe haven. Upon arrival, the waiting begins for a durable
14 See 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 2.
15 See KAREN MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE, & RICHARD A. BOWELL, REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (1997).
16 Id. at 18.
17 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 42.
18 See id. at 39.
19 Id. at 21.
20 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 794 (5th ed. 2003).
21 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 15, at 971.
22 Ten Years in Kenya: An Interview with Abraham Awolich, REFUGEE REP.: A
NEWS SERV. OF IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE SERV. OF AM., May 2004, at 3 [hereinafter
Awolich Interview].
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solution,23 which includes one of three possibilities.
B. Durable Solutions
First, the refugee may voluntarily return to her home country
once the conditions in that country change.2 4 Second, the refugee
may be locally integrated into the country where he or she first
stops to seek safe haven.25 Or, third, the refugee may be sent to
another country-a third country-to resettle permanently there.26
It is in this country, once the waiting for one of these alternatives
commences, that refugees are often warehoused.
1. Voluntary Repatriation
Voluntary repatriation is the opposite of nonrefoulement, a
term resulting from Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. It states
that a refugee cannot be returned by a contracting state to a
country where "his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion. ' '28 However, if the problems that forced
the refugee out of her country are remedied, the refugee may
return home of her own accord.29 In places where internal strife
lasts decades, this option takes equally as long, thus relegating
refugees to protracted time away from home. For instance, from
June to November of 2003, roughly 130,000 Angolan refugees
returned home after twenty-seven years of civil war.3 ° This
suggests that the option of voluntary repatriation is not a quick fix
to a difficult problem. Waiting for this durable solution typically
takes years, and, with that waiting comes the warehousing.
"When we consider our response to refugees and asylum
seekers, what is at stake is the right to live in community. The
first point of reference for action is the human person rather
than the interests of states of national security. The person
23 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 38.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See 1951 Convention, supra note 2.
28 See id.
29 See MUsALo, supra note 15, at 971.
30 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 2 tbl.2.
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comes before the state."
-Australian Social Justice Council31
2. Local Integration into the Host Country
The second durable solution is for the refugee to quasi-
permanently integrate into the country to which he or she first
fled.32 However, many countries of first-asylum are poor or are
themselves not completely politically stable.33 Local integration of
mass numbers of refugees is unlikely in most instances due to the
host county's concerns regarding the possible disruptions it would
cause to the host country's already weak economy, high levels of
unemployment, and inherent ethnic tensions.34 Whether this fear
is truly warranted is beyond the scope of this section. At this
point, it is enough to understand that local integration as a durable
solution is difficult to achieve on any large scale,35 and while the
refugees await this solution, they remain warehoused.
Note that this durable solution is the goal to which law,
donors, and host countries should strive since it is the most likely
candidate to facilitate refugees' rights while they remain in a host
country. This will become more apparent in the following
consideration of CMte d' Ivoire.
3. Third Country Resettlement
The third durable solution is for the refugee to resettle in
another country.36 However, while a refugee is allowed to seek
asylum in a third country under the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, she does not have the right to actually be granted
asylum.37 "Third-country resettlement is offered to no more than
one percent of the world's refugees; and faced with economic
31 Australian Social Justice Council, Quotable Quotes, UNIYA Jesuit Social Justice
Center, http://www.uniyaorg/education/refugees-quotes.htm.
32 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 38.
33 GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE
GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 148 (1993).
34 See id. at 148-49.
35 See id. at 148.
36 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 38.
37 See MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 30 n.28 (1997).
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difficulties and growing popular xenophobia, Western nations are
much more reluctant to admit large numbers of people. . . ."" For
instance, when prospects were ripe for an influx of Haitian
refugees to arrive at the United States coast, President Bush said,
"I have made it abundantly clear to the Coast Guard that we will
turn back any refugee that attempts to reach our shore."'3 9 Despite
such maneuverings around international law, there are ways
refugees can be admitted to Western countries.
In the United States, for instance, there is an overseas refugee
program whereby the President of the United States outlines a
report to Congress which sets a numerical ceiling on the number
of refugees the country will take in for the next fiscal year.4" The
Secretary of Homeland Security then can admit refugees who meet
specific criteria outlined in the President's report and who have
begun the process to come to the United States from an overseas
station at a United States processing post.41 Once selected to come
to the United States, the refugee is given travel documents and
makes the journey to face a year-long probationary period.42
Typically, after the year, the refugee is entitled to adjust his or her
status and become a lawful permanent resident of the United
States.43 Since most often "those who gain admission through the
overseas refugee programs are located in a refugee camp at the
time of their selection," 44 the camp again serves as a holding place
to await this durable solution of resettlement into another country.
C. Outlook of the Durable Solutions
"Most refugees are not offered durable solutions of this kind,
however, but are instead provided with extended temporary
asylum in UNHCR-administered camps or short-term assistance to
see them through the initial repatriation phase. By allowing camps
to become semi-permanent, governments force refugees to become
38 LOESCHER 1993, supra note 33, at 148.
39 Joseph Curl, Bush Warns Haitians Not to Flee to U.S., WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2004, http://www.washtimes.con/world/20040225-114721-5299r.htm.
40 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 808.
41 Seeid. at811.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 Id. at 795.
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wards of international welfare. 45 Consequently, it is clear that
none of the "durable" solutions are either durable or timely. Due
to an inability to reach fitting solutions, millions of refugees wait
in camps.46 While they wait for solutions that take decades or may
never come to fruition, they are denied rights that should be given
to them by international treaties. 47  "Indeed, the key feature of
warehousing is not so much the passage of time as the denial of
rights."48
Il. Introduction to the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol
"[H]uman rights 'belong not to a chosen few, but all people. It
is this universality that endows human rights with the power to
cross any border and defy any force.'
-Kofl Anan, 199949
This section examines the individual rights guaranteed to
refugees under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. First,
the section considers why rights are so essential. In reviewing the
rights to work, travel, have housing, use property, receive
education, and be free from discrimination this section will
indicate reasons why each right may be granted or denied in
practice.
A. Refugee Rights and Their Importance
"A refugee is a kneeling person, kneeling in front of the captain
of a ship to ask for a reduction in his escape price, kneeling to
pirates to ask for mercy, kneeling in front of an international
organization to ask for its help, kneeling in front of the police to
ask for permission to go to the market, kneeling in front of a
foreign delegation to ask to be accepted in their country."
-Nooria Wazefadost, 200450
45 LOESCHER, supra note 33, at 150.
46 See id. at 149.
47 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 38.
48 Id.
49 Kofi A. Annan, Foreword to THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND, at v (Yael Danieli, Elsa Stamatopoulou & Clarence J. Dias
eds., 1999).
50 Nooria Wazefadost, A Young Refugee's Plea for a Better Future, SYDNEY
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The body of law that governs refugees is based largely on two
treaties, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 51 Enshrined
in these treaties are articles that establish rights to be afforded
refugees while they are waiting for one of the aforementioned
durable solutions. 52 However, these rights are often denied, which
gives way to warehousing.53
There is no question that most camps are not temporary-they
often last through quarter- and even half-centuries of chaos and
turmoil5 4 However, just because a camp lasts does not mean that
it lasts under adequate or even marginal conditions. Human
beings are very resilient and are able to live-in the physical
sense-long after hope and happiness have passed. Thus, to
suggest that camps far outlive the temporal pressures of mass
influx means nothing in terms of their ability to support healthy
human existence for the long term. "[M]ore than half a million
refugees from Myanmar have lived without the right to work or
travel for up to twenty years in Thailand, Bangladesh, Malaysia,
and India.' ' 55  There are roughly 250,000 Palestinian refugees
warehoused in Lebanon, some of whom have been there for fifty-
five years.56 They are not allowed to work, and they have no
property. 57 Due to this and resultant feelings of idleness, aid
workers have noticed increased levels of depression.58 "I am
landless, and without citizenship; if I have nothing, then I hope for
nothing," a young adult commented on personal experiences
within a refugee camp in South Asia.59 A young woman who
spent fifteen years in a Thai refugee camp observed that, "[1living
MORNING HERALD, June 21, 2004, http://www.smh.com.au/news/Opinion/A-young-
refugees-plea-for-a-better-future/2004/06/20/1087669843457.html?oneclick=true.
51 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 796-800.
52 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 40.
53 See id. at 38.
54 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 42 (tbl.3).
55 Id.
56 See id. at 3 tbl.3.
57 See JEFF CRISP, THE CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION STUDIES, No
SOLUTIONS IN SIGHT: THE PROBLEM OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS IN AFRICA 13
(2002).
58 Warehoused Refugees: By Region, REFUGEE REP.: A NEWS SERV. OF IMMIGR.
AND REFUGEE SERV. OF AM., May 2004, at 5.
59 Id.
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in a refugee camp was like being physically alive but spiritually
dead. My brain stopped thinking. All I knew was the camp, while
people outside were working for their development."6 Another
refugee who spent ten years in a Kenyan refugee camp lamented,
"The camp was one big dead end. Even if you were smart, you
were stranded, stuck, and could not go beyond where you were to
the other side.... One day, I thought maybe God created us for a
special experiment that we were not meant to live like other
human beings.' Conditions in camps vary. Some allow a
refugee to receive better, more nutritious food and water than she
received in her home country, while others are horrific, bringing
refugees close to starvation. In both cases, authorities are
beginning to understand that extended stays in camps can "have
extremely damaging psychological effects and are totally
unsatisfactory as a long-term solution. '6 2  In order to mitigate
against this level of despair from warehousing, refugees must be
granted their rights and be able to find sustenance in a way that not
only provides for the physical body, but also for mental well-
being.63
1. Right to Work
"What could this man have been yesterday? A sower in the
spring, a harvester in the fall... ? And today? A refugee with a
bowl in his hand, queuing for soup. What a waste of human
energy, I think, an abasement of dignity.... [A] billion people
capable of work with nothing or almost nothing to do for the
duration of their lives .... If they could be given worthwhile
occupations, humanity could make dizzying progress. The
world's wealth would be doubled. Pyramids of merchandise
would rise in even the poorest countries. Granaries would
overflow. Water would flood the largest deserts."
-Ryszard Kapuscinski, 199164
60 Naw Musi: Warehoused for Fifteen Years in Thailand, REFUGEE REP.: A NEWS
SERV. OF IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE SERV. OF AM., May 2004, at 7.
61 Awolich Interview, supra note 22, at 4.
62 LOESCHER, supra note 33, at 149.
63 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 54.
64 Barbara Harrel-Bond, Towards the Economic and Social 'Integration' of
Refugee Populations in Host Countries in Africa, from the Stanley Foundation
conference "Refugee Protection in Africa: How to Ensure Security and Development for
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In order to be sustainable, "encampment populations must be
able to consume; in order to consume, encampment residents must
have income., 65 In order to have income, warehoused refugees
must be able to work.66 It is a simple prospect and one that most
people undoubtedly take for granted. However, the drafters of the
1951 Convention made sure this right was prominent in
international law.
Article 17 and Article 18 of the 1951 Convention detail the
right of refugees to support themselves.67 Article 17 states that
refugees lawfully permitted to stay should be given the same
treatment as other foreign nationals regarding the right to work.68
Furthermore, any restrictive measure that would inhibit any
noncitizen's right to work in the territory should be lifted once the
refugee is present in the territory for three years, marries a
national, or has a child from within the national borders.6 9 Article
18 states that refugees lawfully permitted to stay should, at a
minimum, be given the same treatment as any other noncitizen
regarding the right to work in "agriculture, industry, handicrafts
and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial
companies. ' 7 °
What, though, does this right to work really mean? The 1951
Convention does specify that refugees have a right to work, but it
does "not specify that host communities must open their labor
markets to newcomers, so the decision seems to rest entirely with
host authorities. 71
Under Sudan's Regulation of Asylum Act of 1974, all refugees
have the right to work in any field outside their encampments.72
Lebanon, in contrast, passed a law in 1964 that pronounced that no
Refugees and Hosts," Nov. 10-14, 2002, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/reports/
hrp/HRP02B.pdf.
65 MILICA Z. BOOKMAN, AFTER INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REFUGEE ENCAMPMENTS 92 (2002).
66 See id.
67 See 1951 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 17, 18.
68 See id. art. 17(1).
69 See id. art. 17(2).
70 Id. art. 18.
71 BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 136.
72 See id.
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foreigner could work or even volunteer his or her labor without a
permit.73 In 1982, Lebanon expanded the law and specified that
work permits would only be given for tasks involving direct
labor.7 4 Work permits for professional jobs would be limited to
doctors or pharmacists allowed only to work in the Palestine Red
Crescent Society Clinics.75 The right ensconced in international
law, therefore, wholly depends on the host country's treatment of
it in domestic law.76
2. Right to Travel
"I wished I was a cat, because a cat is free to move where he
wants."
-A child from the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus77
Even if working rights are granted as they are promised, a
refugee still must travel to work or find a home located close to
work. Article 26 provides for freedom of movement in the host
country for refugees who are there lawfully. 78 Refugees have "the
right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within
[the] territory" subject only to the standard treatment of
noncitizens, generally.79
Article 28 gives the added right to move outside the territory.
It states that refugees may obtain documents to travel outside the
host country.81 Even if a country's law permits the issuing of
travel documents, the right to acquire the document and then use it
is far from certain. For Abraham Awolich, who spent ten years in
Kenya's Kakuma refugee camp, getting a travel document to work
73 See id.
74 See id. at 137.
75 See id.
76 See Zachary A. Lomo, The Struggle for Protection of the Rights of Refugees and
IDPs in Africa: Making the Existing International Legal Regime Work, 18 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 268, 275 (2000) (discussing the failure of many African countries to put
international treaty obligations into domestic legislation).
77 Refugee Voices from the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus, REFUGEE REP.: A
NEWS SERV. OF IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE SERV. OF AM., May 2004, at 11.
78 See 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art. 26.
79 Id.
80 See id. art. 28.
81 See id.
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outside the camp was difficult.82 The document could only be
obtained in cases of emergency; even then, the process often took
months.83 With the difficulties proving prohibitive, Awolich once
tried to sneak out of the camp only to be held at gun-point by a
local man who then ordered his twelve-year-old son to beat
Awolich until he bled. 84 Under such conditions, even if, de jure,
the host country allows travel documents to be issued, de facto,
there is no such right.85
This particular right is diminished or absent due to fear by host
countries that refugees' freedom to move freely would devastate
labor markets and reduce wages for locals.86 Additionally, fear of
crime, pressure on infrastructure, and lack of control of host
governments factor in the denial of the right to move freely.87
While the relevancy of these fears can be debated, that is beyond
the scope of this paper. The point is to understand that while the
denial of rights may come from a legitimate fear, this denial of
rights can still be a major human rights violation. One such
example is the aforementioned beating of a twelve-year-old boy.
Furthermore, the benefits of freedom of movement are
immense and seem likely to help the host country. "Were the
international community to realize Convention rights universally,
or even regionally, refugees could leave camps for better
opportunities not only within the country of first asylum but in
other nations as well. There is no logical reason why their
protection should be limited to countries that happen to border
their own. 88 The freedom to reasonably obtain a travel document
and move freely outside the camp and the country would give the
refugees a level of self-sufficiency and would honor the 1951
Convention rights while easing the burden of the host country.
3. Rights to Housing and Property
"What will you say when your grandchildren ask you: 'Didn't
82 See Awolich Interview, supra note 22, at 3.
83 See id.
84 Id.
85 See BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 136; see also Lomo, supra note 76, at 281.
86 BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 134-35.
87 See id. at 135.
88 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 53.
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you know that little children were kept behind razor-wire fences
for two years or more?'?"
-Hugh Mackay, 2002"9
Building on these rights, the 1951 Convention adds Articles 13
and 21.90 Article 13 states that refugees have the right to acquire
or lease movable and immovable property to the same degree as
other noncitizens, and Article 21 states that a refugee has the same
right to housing as would any other noncitizen.9
In refugee camp conditions, poverty is magnified by a loss of
property or a denial of the right to work on or to own property.92
During the typical displacement process, a refugee will lose
everything when fleeing home.93 The refugee's house, land, and
often his or her business is abandoned, taken, or destroyed.94 Very
rarely are refugees ever compensated for losses, and especially not
at the beginning of their encampment in another country.95
Without property rights, refugees cannot retain self-sufficiency in
farming; they are less likely to undertake risky ventures or
investments; and investors are not as likely to invest in them due
to the lack of collateral.96
Host communities, however, are disinclined to give good land
to refugees since local residents-often themselves poor and
without land-may grow resentful. 97 Aside from the problem of
property rights, the land to which refugees do have access is
frequently poor. Camp lands are often located in extremely
uninhabitable places; 98 this could be due to the very divergent
goals of the U.N. Convention and host country policy.
One possibility is to make life so miserable that the refugees
89 Hugh Mackay, Shame On Us All, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 30, 2002,
http://www.chilout.org/news/shame-on-us-all.html.
90 See 1951 Convention, supra note 2.
91 See id. arts. 13, 21.
92 See BOoKMAN, supra note 65, at 129.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 130-31.
97 See BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 131.
98 See Awolich Interview, supra note 22, at 3.
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will leave. 99  The right of nonrefoulement--or not returning
refugees to the country persecuting them-is seen as the most
important right regarding refugees, and most countries will not
deny this right. On the other hand, some countries try to effectuate
the refugees' return under the guise of welcoming them.'00 A host
country may provide refugees with "basic infrastructure, condone
minor economic activity, and then create unpalatable conditions
that initiate a refugee exodus."'0 '
Mexico provided only limited services to refugee camps so
that Guatemalans encamped there would suffer hunger and
disease.102 This may be the reason so many Guatemalans
prematurely returned home.'0 3 Additionally, Hong Kong housed
refugees in prisons so that within one year's time, fifty-seven
percent of the Vietnamese refugees went back home.'
4. Right to Education
"I think that the children should be free, and when they are
there for one year or two years they are just wasting their time,
they could go to school and they could learn something. They
could be free. Instead, they are like a bird in a cage."
-10 year-old Afghan refugee105
Realizing that children are refugees and that some stay in
countries long enough to grow to adulthood, the 1951 Convention
requires that they receive education. 10 6  Article 22 states that
refugees should receive the same treatment as nationals regarding
elementary education, and refugees should receive the same
treatment as noncitizens regarding all other forms of education,
99 See BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 120.
100 See id. at 119-120.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 120.
103 Id.
104 BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 120.
105 Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, A Last Resort -
Summary Guide: A Summary of the Important Issues, Findings and Recommendations
of the National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention, http://www.hreoc
.gov.au/human-rights/children detention-report/summaryguide/4_facts.htm.
106 See 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 168; see also BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at
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"as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school
certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and
charges and the award of scholarships."' 7
While refugees have the right to education, exercising that
right may seriously strain their host country's resources. 10 8 By
building additional schools, hiring more teachers, and buying
supplies, refugees are a costly burden to their host countries. One
way countries handle the conflict between international
requirements and domestic ability to provide for these
requirements is to pay "lip service to international law" while
giving local authorities the ability to determine what actually
happens on the ground in local communities. 109  For example,
when the right to education is granted on a micro-level, often local
discrimination found in certain areas of a country will inhibit the
refugees encamped there from attaining internationally- and even
domestically-required rights."0 Because of this, when targeted
groups are concentrated into camps, discrimination can play a
major role in refugees' access to education that might not
otherwise be true if local government was not given so much
freedom of authority or if refugees were not so easily singled out
due to their encampment."' This is another reason that local
integration of refugees should be a primary goal.
5. Right to Not be Discriminated Against
Article 3 states that refugees should not be discriminated
against regarding "race, religion or country of origin."' 12 This may
be the single category that most affects every other right
guaranteed to refugees in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.
It is not uncommon for host and home countries to discriminate
on the basis of ethnicity. Discrimination (often institutionalized,
explicit, and legalized) determines the nature of interaction
between host populations and encampment residents because it
condones different treatment and different rules (in employment,
107 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 168.
108 See BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 131.
109 See id. at 132.
110 See id. at 132-33.
I"I See id. at 133.
112 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 156.
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consumption, production, exchange, [education,] etc.) for
different people. It justifies treating some ethnic groups better
than others.
13
Discrimination does not usually flow merely from everyday
practices of a country's citizens. Often, discrimination is
embedded in law via host country constitutions and policies
regarding "taxes, property rights, labor conditions and economic
development."' 1 4  It is clear, then, that the standard of
implementing international law into the host country's domestic
law may produce problems for refugees without some
international compliance measures.1 5
IV. C6te d'Ivoire: A Case Study
Now it is important to consider how these laws, both domestic
and international, take effect on the ground. In order to do that,
this section will introduce C6te d'Ivoire as a case study.
C6te d'Ivoire is unique in that it has generally been one of the
strongest countries in Africa in terms of stability and economic
development. It was a best-case refugee scenario, but it changed
suddenly into a very frightening place to live for refugees. Due to
its history, we are afforded the chance to think critically about
what happened, what went wrong, how the law could have acted
to change things, and how other actors could have played a role
early on.
A. Brief History of C6te d'Ivoire and Its Early Response to
Liberian Refugees
C6te d'Ivoire became a French colony in 1893, and gained
independence from France in 1960.116 The first President was
Felix Houphoudt-Boigny, and he remained in office until his death
in 1993.1' Many believe that the political stability enjoyed by
C6te d'Ivoire since 1960 was largely based on President
Houphou~t-Boigny, who placed openness to foreigners as a top
113 BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 139.
114 Id. at 140.
115 See Lomo, supra note 76, at 275.
116 See U.S. Dep't. of State: Bureau of Afr. Aff., Background Note: C6te d'Ivoire,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm [hereinafter Bureau of Afr. Aff.].
117 See id.
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priority." 8 He was supported by one party and is acclaimed for
having won over the traditional chiefs of C6te d'Ivoire by
"bestowing honours upon them."" 9  However, some say that
President Houphoudt-Boigny was accepting of foreigners out of
necessity. With over sixty indigenous ethnic groups living in C6te
d'Ivoire, he had to make inclusion central to his political
strategy. 120 During his term, all of the major ethnic groups were
represented in his cabinet or in other major policy-making
bodies. 12
1
During his tenure, President Houphoudt-Boigny kept C6te
d'Ivoire closely aligned with the West while many of its
neighboring countries were growing increasingly unstable due to
political strife, civil war, and the creation of ties to the Soviet
Union and China. 122 During the 1960s and 1970s, C6te d'Ivoire's
economic success was dubbed the "Ivoirian miracle,"'23 and C6te
d'Ivoire was thought of as an oasis of political stability and
economic prosperity. 124  This "miracle" was built on foreign
capital and cheap labor from poor neighbors.125 Between 1960 and
1979, CMte d'Ivoire's gross national product grew by almost eight
percent every year.12
6
Due to President Houphoudt-Boigny, C6te d'Ivoire also stood
out as a model on how to accept and integrate refugees when the
mass influx of Liberian refugees began in 1989.127 In December of
118 See id.
119 ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICA SERIES: THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE IVORY COAST 5-6 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1976) (quoting AFRICA '71, IVORY COAST
278 (Africana Publishing Corp.)).
120 See Country Studies, http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/3.htm.
121 See id.
122 See Bureau of Afr. Aff., supra note 116.
123 INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ICG AFRICA REPORT No. 82, COTE D'IVOIRE: No PEACE IN
SIGHT, July 12, 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/west-africa/
082_cote d ivoire-no peace in-sight.doc [hereinafter INT'L CRISIS GROUP No. 82].
124 See Country Studies, supra note 120.
125 See INT'L CRISIS GROUP No. 82, supra note 123.
126 See Country Studies, supra note 120.
127 See TOM KUHLMAN, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
RESPONDING TO PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF LIBERIAN
REFUGEES IN COTE D'IVOIRE 3 (2002), http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home
/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3d40064 ! 2&page=research [hereinafter KUHLMAN].
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that year, Liberians began pouring over the C6te d'Ivoirian border
due to the civil war in Liberia.128 Over 700,000 people fled their
country by the height of the war, 9 and this number does not take
into account people who fled their homes without crossing an
international border. 130  Liberia's pre-war population was 2.5
million, but by 1996 some estimates report that its population
suffered up to 200,000 deaths.'31 The first major exodus from
Liberia brought roughly 70,000 refugees into C6te d'Ivoire in only
4 months. 13
2
B. CMte d'Ivoire: The Years of Neighborly Kindness
As discussed briefly above, there are many ways nations
respond to such an influx of refugees. In the case of C6te d'Ivoire
under President Houphoudt-Boigny, the reaction was one of
neighborly kindness. He stated that the refugees should be
considered "brothers in distress," and that they should not be
settled into camps but should be taken into the community.
131
Since colonial times when migrant workers traveled into CMte
d'Ivoire-some nationalized, and some did not-foreigners "were
accorded virtually equal rights with Ivoirians,. . . even the right to
vote."' 134 As late as 1988, twenty-eight percent of C6te d'Ivoire's
population consisted of foreigners, one of the highest proportions
in the world.'35 Since C6te d'Ivoire has traditionally been a
country, which used the work and skill of many foreigners, new
"brothers in distress" were more welcome than they might have
been elsewhere.
The reason behind such a neighborly response to 70,000
refugees certainly involved economic goals. As long as rapid
growth lasted, foreigners were welcome. Even though C6te
d'Ivoire's economy began a downward spiral in the late 1980s,
136
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See id. at 10.
132 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 11.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 15.
135 See id.
136 See Country Studies, supra note 120.
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President Houphouet-Boigny appreciated the role of foreign
workers in terms of C6te d'Ivoire's development.137
The consideration that many of the Liberian refugees shared
the same ethnicity as Western Ivoirians must also have influenced
President Houphout-Boigny's tolerance. "[T]he Gio in the area of
Danane where the borders of C6te d'Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea
meet; the Krahn in the area of Guiglo further south; and the Kru
plus related groups" had ethnic kin on both sides of the border. 138
This area, called the Zone d'Accueil de R6fugi6s (ZAR), became
the designated area into which the Liberian refugees streamed.1
39
Of CMte d'Ivoire's nineteen regions, the ZAR is made up of
four, consisting of Danane, Toulepleu, Guiglo, and Tabou."4 '
Instead of confining the Liberian refugees to a small camp,
President Houphout-Boigny gave them the ZAR: an area roughly
forty kilometers long by seventy kilometers wide with an area of
21,000 kilometers, populated by similar ethnic groups. 4 ' Refugees
were free to settle and integrate anywhere within the ZAR, but
were not encouraged to move beyond it.142 In 2002, the ZAR had
a population of roughly 800,000, of which one in six was a
refugee. "'
Upon arrival, refugees began to spread throughout the ZAR,
with some moving into towns and others remaining in the rural
areas.'" This kind of freedom is not typical for most refugee
situations. Instead of being able to move freely within such a
large area, most refugees-in countries as different as England and
Kenya-are confined to small camps. 145 Yet in C6te d'Ivoire,
refugees were able to set out on their own and settle where they
wished.146 Even by the end of 1990, with the Liberian refugeepopulation increasing to 272,000, spontaneous settlement
137 See id.
138 KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 11.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 1 1 n.1.
141 See id. at 17.
142 See id. at 11.
143 See id. at 18.
144 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127 at 11.
145 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 24, 106-10.
146 See id. at 143.
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remained the norm. 147
Generally, this trend remained unhindered from 1989 until
1995, when the first refugees were moved into Cfte d'Ivoire's
only refugee camp. 148  Charles Taylor's troops launched an
incursion at Tai in southern Guiglo in which many Liberians and
some Ivoirians were killed. At that point, the refugee population
of Tai was moved to a "camp set up at Nicla, just outside of the
town of Guiglo and well away from the border.' 49 This was the
first moment when refugees faced any threat of being warehoused.
1. Rights Granted During the Neighborly Years
Some argue that cooperation with international law is only a
consensual theory. It may be surrounded by some legal aspects,
but it is "absent of any mandatory legal repercussions in cases of
non-compliance.' 150  As a result of this lack of enforceability,
nations only impose international law to the extent that their own
domestic law provides for the same rights as international law. At
one time, much of C6te d'Ivoire's domestic law and custom aided
in granting the rights guaranteed under the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol. This section considers the 1951 Convention rights
discussed above and how C6te d'Ivoire's domestic law or custom
facilitated their award.
First, one must consider that C6te d'Ivoire allowed the
refugees to come over the border. C6te d'Ivoire's position of
nonrefoulement is in harmony with the primary goal of the 1951
Convention. During the years of the original mass influx of
refugees, "all Liberians were accepted as refugees on a prima facie
basis.' 51 They came over the border and were immediately
considered refugees with no formal process to justify the status.
Instead of being confined to a camp, the refugees were
welcomed with open arms and invited to settle freely within the
ZAR.152 They had just left their homes, families, jobs, farms, and
147 See id.
148 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 11.
149 Id.
150 ANN VIBEKE EGGLI, MASS REFUGEE INFLUX AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (2002).
151 KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 22.
152 See U.S. Comm. for Refugees, 1997 Country Reports: Cote d'Ivoire (1997),
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most of their possessions. Upon arriving, however, they were able
to start anew.
After UNHCR gave initial food and emergency supplies,
refugees were able to set out and look for jobs. While the majority
of refugees settled in border towns near Liberia, "an estimated
20,000 to 50,000 migrated to urban centers such as the capital,
Abidjan."'153 With the right to work afforded by Article 17 of the
1951 Convention, 154 refugees were allowed to farm, operate small
businesses, and find general local employment. 55 They were
allowed to work in all of these fields without any special permit. 56
Businesses anywhere in C6te d'Ivoire need to be registered, but a
refugee could obtain this registration just as easily as a national.' 57
At this time, foreign nationals (including refugees) only needed a
residence permit-called a carte de sejour, given by the Ivoirian
government-and a carte consulair, which proved the refugee was
registered with the representative of his or her own country. 158
Some reports show that by late 1995 many Liberian refugees were
struggling to make a living and meet their daily needs. 59 The
significant point is that C6te d'Ivoire was making every effort to
meet the challenge of incorporating its international obligations
into domestic action.
The right to work means little without the right to free travel.
Refugees were initially free to travel within the ZAR and
sometimes even outside of the ZAR during the first six or seven
years of their refuge. 6 ' Refugees had to apply for a travel permit
which, during this time, was not difficult to obtain.61 ' This ease of
travel, however, was not as much a matter of law, but a matter of
politics. During the early years, refugees were viewed in a
http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/1997/cotedivoire.htm [hereinafter 1997
Country Reports].
153 See id.
154 See 1951 Convention, supra note 2.
155 See 1997 Country Reports, supra note 152.
156 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 22.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See 1997 Country Reports, supra note 152.
160 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 23.
161 See id.
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favorable light by the government; 162 and thus, there was greater
ease of movement and travel. The ability to travel outside a
specified zone in order to work, to visit, or for any purpose
satisfies the 1951 Convention's Articles 26 and 28.163
Refugees were given the rights to travel and to work. Since
the economy in western Africa is very largely based on agrarian
professions, the right to property and land is often a major
requirement for the success and independence of most refugees.
1 64
During the first several years after the mass influx of Liberian
refugees, Cfte d'Ivoire met the land needs of refugees.16
5
Since 1967, C6te d'Ivoire has officially recognized that "land
belongs to the person who brings it into production."'66  This
decree has been used not only by indigenous people, but also by
migrant workers and immigrants.'67 While part of the 1967 decree
required that exploitation rights for the land must be registered, in
practice most land use is subject only to customary and local-level
law. 168 The registration of land rights is viewed as government
intrusion by locals; and thus, land is apportioned in traditional
ways, leaving much room for ethnic tensions and mass immigrant
influx to infiltrate the local decision-making process.
For instance, in land boundary conflicts and threats of
expropriation 169 a person's power over land contract terms varies
depending on the local population's density and demand: the
greater the number of migrants wanting land, the lower the
bargaining power of the individual. 17  During these first years
through the mid-1990s, the national government took a back seat
162 See 1997 Country Reports, supra note 152.
163 See 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 2.
164 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 15 tbl.3. In 1997, the refugee population in
CMte d'Ivoire was composed overwhelmingly of farmers. Over forty-two percent of the
refugees farmed the land as a primary occupation. See id.
165 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 43.
166 JOHN R. HEATH, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NUMBER 238, LAND RIGHTS IN
COTE D'IvOIRE: SURVEY AND PROSPECTS FOR PROJECT INTERVENTION 32 (1993).
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 20.
170 See id. at 23.
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in this land bargaining process.17' This meant that refugees could
make choices about where they wanted to live within the ZAR and
bargain on their own terms with local leaders to cultivate land.
This is strikingly different from most refugee situations where
refugees are placed in camps and forbidden to farm land.
While immigrants in C6te d'Ivoire have traditionally had the
same usufruct rights (a form of sharecropping) over the land as
indigenous groups, the rights associated with land usage are highly
dependent on location within the country. 172 For instance, while
western C6te d'Ivoire's Krou people are less centralized than other
groups, refugees have typically had an easier time moving freely
in the west and farming land with few, if any, restrictions.'
Conversely, the situation is a bit different in the east. The Akan
people of eastern C6te d'Ivoire have been willing to assimilate
outsiders into their culture. 174 They allow migrant farmers to work
for them, sometimes permitting the Akan to take more than half of
the harvest for themselves.175 This may seem like a large portion
of payment for land usage rights, but the migrants are also well
integrated into these communities. They are expected to live in
the same villages as their indigenous hosts and are even allowed to
fully participate in community cooperatives with indigenous
peoples. 176
To different degrees, both of these attitudes were passed to
Liberian refugees who settled among their ethnic kin in the ZAR.
Many refugees who settled in both villages and towns were given
land to cultivate and the usufruct rights to that land.' There were
restrictions on what refugees could plant; but since most refugees
were biding time until they could go back to Liberia, they usually
only wanted land in order to feed themselves instead of using it to
make permanent businesses. 178
171 See id. at 23.
172 See id. at 26.
173 See HEATH, supra note 166, at 26.
174 See id. at 25.
175 See id.
176 See id. at 25-26.
177 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 21.
178 See id. Since refugee access to land is thought of as temporary, refugees were
only allowed to plant crops for consumption. Refugees were not allowed to plant cash
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In some cases, refugees were most accepted among their own
ethnic group, 179 which meant that they could only find land to
cultivate from Ivoirians who were ethnically the same as the
refugee.' 80 However, if a refugee settled in a town, he could
usually find work in a plantation as a laborer 8 ' without as much
regard for his ethnicity. The indigenous farmer hired a migrant or
refugee initially as a short-contract wage worker. 182  Later, the
migrant could be upgraded to a sharecropper which entitled him to
one-third of the crop.183 Since most plantation crops of coffee and
cocoa trees have a production life of thirty years, the migrant
could conceivably have a lifetime contract.184
During the time surrounding the above-mentioned land and
farming rights, the ruling political party continued to back
migrants and their rights to land.'85 Whether this was to win the
vote of the migrant population-a quarter of the country--or to
promote agricultural growth, the dominant party backed the rights
of migrants-and, in turn, of refugees-to land and to work the
land. 186
Article 13 of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol states
that refugees must be accorded the same rights as other
noncitizens to lease or contract for property. CMte d'Ivoire
supported these obligations during the first part of the Liberian
refugees' stay. 187 With the freedom to move about and to freely
bargain for work or land, refugees had the chance to become self-
sufficient and dignified in their efforts to work for themselves.
188
It is this type of freedom that kept these Liberian refugees from
crops like oil palms, rubber, cocoa, or coffee since these are not annual crops. Id. at 22.
179 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 22.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See HEATH, supra note 166, at 27.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See HEATH, supra note 166, at 48 n.21 (citing Barbara C. Lewis, Land, Property
and Politics: Rural Divo at the Fin de Regime (unpublished paper, presented at the
African Studies Association Annual Meeting, St. Louis, Missouri, Nov. 23-26, 1991)).
186 See id.
187 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 43.
188 See id.
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becoming warehoused.
As for the warehousing of children, C6te d'Ivoire was ready
and willing to stop such a fate from happening. C6te d'Ivoire
drew up a plan in 1991 to place refugee children directly into
Ivoirian schools by building more classrooms for the new refugee
arrivals.'89 If local integration of refugees is the best durable
solution in terms of staving off protracted refugee situations, the
integration of children into local schools is a good means to that
end. In this instance, C6te d'Ivoire was willing to remain true to
its international obligations under Article 22 of the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol. However, CMte d'Ivoire's
invitation for local integration was denied, due to other factors that
will be addressed in the next section.
Finally, the major rights previously described, with the
exception of property rights, were given (or offered, in the case of
education) regardless of race, religion, or country of origin. CMte
d'Ivoire was generally in compliance with Article 3 of the 1951
Convention.
C. Cbte d'Ivoire: The Years of Xenophobia
Traditionally, C6te d'Ivoire practiced an "open door"
immigration policy, which allowed immigrants free access to land
and to vote. This resulted in a refugee population increase to over
a quarter of the total population. 9 ' However, the 1990s saw this
history eroding as C6te d'Ivoire became "one of the twelve nations
in Sub-Saharan Africa to officially declare that the level of
immigration is too high."'19' The history behind that decision
marks a turning point for C6te d'Ivoire and its refugees.
In 1993, President Houphouit-Boigny died, and Henri Konan
Brdid replaced him. 192  President Houphouet-Boigny contained
189 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 30.
190 Theophile Kouamouo, Trouble in the Hospitable Land: Africa's Xenophobic
Problems, UNESCO, Sept. 2001, http://www.looksmarttrends.comp/articles/miml310
/is_2001_Sept/ai79007223. By 1998, the concept of Ivoiritd had taken a strong hold,
even though the percentage of foreigners living in C6te d'Ivoire reached twenty-six
percent, with nearly half that number actually born in CMte d'Ivoire. "In absolute
numbers, [this] is about four million foreign citizens [in] a total population of fifteen
million." KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 15-16.
191 See HEATH, supra note 166, at 6.
192 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 16.
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growing xenophobia in the southwest by giving members of
certain groups posts in his "administration, the private sector, and
the army.' ' 193 When he died, conciliatory attempts like these no
longer existed.
President Konan B6di6 was not nearly as secure in his power
as Houphoudt-Boigny had been; consequently, he needed extra
support against his political opponent, a Northerner named
Alassane Ouattara.194 At this point, President Konan Brdi6 began
a campaign that would set citizens against foreigners in two
aspects: a literal delineation (actual foreigners against citizens) and
an ethnic delineation (citizens from ethnic tribes thought not to be
culturally pure against citizens from culturally pure heritages). 95
This would give the Southerners-considered by most to be "true
Ivoirians"-a critical advantage, making way not only for
President Konan B6di6's re-election against Outtara, but also
giving "official sanction to xenophobia and ethnic rivalry."'
196
To accomplish these goals, President Konan Brdi6 began a
policy of Ivoiritg or Ivoirian-ness. 197 With the Ivoirite concept
came a new electoral code encompassing two types of citizen:
'pure' Ivoirian citizens and citizens of 'mixed heritage' who while
having lived in Crte d'Ivoire all their lives, were still considered
foreigners. 98 This last group matched Ouattara, Konan Brdi6's
political opponent, since his father was alleged to be from Burkina
Faso, just north of Crte d'Ivoire. 199 In the end, Ouattara was not
even permitted to run for president.2°
The concept of Ivoiriti, however, had much greater
ramifications than just in political circles. The concept pitted not
only foreigners (very broadly defined) against Ivoirians, but it also
pitted North against South; and thus, Muslim against Christian.
Many Muslim northerners subsequently lost their government
193 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ICG AFRICA REPORT No. 72, COTE D'IVOIRE: THE
WAR IS NOT YET OVER 5-6 (2003) [hereinafter INT'L CRISIS GROUP No. 72].
194 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 16.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See Kouamouo, supra note 190, at 1.
198 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 16.
199 See id.
200 See id.
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positions, sowing the seeds of a north-south, Muslim-Christian
divide.20' Many immigrants were forced to leave the country.2 °2
At the same time, the economy began a downward spiral.
"Between 1984 and 1998, GDP per capita at purchasing-power
parity declined from $2,160 to $1,730; by comparison, in 1984
C6te d'Ivoire was slightly more prosperous than Egypt and twice
as well off as Senegal, whereas by 1998 its average purchasing
power was only half that of Egypt and equivalent to Senegal's. 2 °3
Despite the government's agreement to a structural adjustment
program in 1993, by 1999 and 2000 real gross domestic product
"per capita declined again, by about seven percent compared to
1998.,, 204 By 1998, the attitude that resulted from this decline was
that the migrant workers and refugees no longer added to the
economic stability of the country.2 5  Rather, they were now
viewed as competitors for the remaining economic "crumbs" of a
worsening situation.2 6
With the economic crisis, many Ivoirians could no longer find
work in urban areas; therefore, they sought a return to farming.2 7
Upon return to the land, however, Ivoirian farmers began to find
that it was overcrowded.2 8 Coupled with Ivoirit,, the land
shortage problem was increasingly viewed as an immigration
problem rather than as an economic problem. 20 9  The policy of
inviting workers from other parts of Africa in order to help
develop C6te d'Ivoire was considered the reason for the land
shortage. °
201 See id.
202 Refugees International.org, Ivory Coast: Expect Further Displacement Unless
Xenophobia is Curbed (May 7, 2003), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/
article/detail/863/&output=printer [hereinafter Ivory Coast].
203 KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 16.
204 Id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 Kouamouo, supra note 190, at 31.
208 See INT'L CRISIS GROUP No. 72, supra note 193, at 6.
209 See id.
210 See Kouamouo, supra note 190, at 30-31. In reality, an environmental problem
was one of the reasons for the economic crisis. "The growth in production of perennial
cash-crops depends on the availability of virgin forest for clearing; C6te d'Ivoire has
now cleared most of its forests, which has led to a shortage of land for cultivation as well
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This trend in the economy, coinciding with President Konan
B~di's political divisions, caused strife in the immigrant and
refugee communities as Houphouet-Boigny's vision of an Ivoirian
'melting pot' was cast aside.211 All foreigners-and even Ivoirian
citizens who belonged to the same ethnic group as foreigners-
were ostracized.21 2
Whereas President Houphouit-Boigny had opened arms to
refugees and had said that land should go to those who put it to
use,213 President Konan Bddi6 stood for a limited view of Ivoirian
cultural identity, closing the doors on anyone who did not fit the
description. His land use mantra was "the land to its original
owners."214
On December 1999, President Konan Bdid's government was
overthrown by a military coup, and General Robert Guri stepped
into his shoes as leader of CMte d'Ivoire.215 He introduced a new
constitution in 2000 that was subsequently approved by
referendum. 216 One major facet of the changed constitution was a
clause that demanded that all presidential candidates. should be of
Ivoirian nationality and parentage. 217  Thus, the xenophobia did
not stop with President Konan Bdi6's rule. General Gu6i stood
for official presidential elections in October 2000 against Laurent
Gbagbo, and when the "vote count showed that [Gu6i] had lost, he
ordered counting to be stopped and declared himself the
winner. ' ' 21 8 "The nationwide voting participation rate was [thirty-
as concerns about the sustainability of timber production." KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at
16.
211 See INT'L CRISIS GROUP No. 72, supra note 193, at 6. "In November 1999, the
anti-foreigner sentiment resulted in the displacement of 15,000 Burkinab~s who were
chased from their homes in the southwestern town of Tabou." Ivory Coast, supra note
202.
212 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 16.
213 See A. NICOLAS KOUDOU & RICHARD P. VLOSKY, GOVERNMENT FOREST
POLICIES, in C6te d'Ivoire 4 (La. Forest Prods. Lab., Working Paper No. 29, 1998).
214 Id.
215 See id. at 17.
216 Immigration and Nationality Directorate, CMte d'lvoire Bulletin 2/2004 (2004),
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/O/country-information/bulletins/test--
_cote_d_ivoire.html.
217 See id.
218 KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 17; see also Immigration and Nationality
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three] percent, and some polling places, especially in the north,
closed early because of the lack of voters. 21 9
After another uprising, Gudi's soldiers abandoned him; 22° and
part of the army, the Presidential Guard, and the Gendarmerie took
Gbagbo's side.22' Gbagbo was then installed as C6te d'Ivoire's
next president with 59.4% of the vote.
By this time, Ouattara was still fighting the accusation that he
was Burkinab6, and thus, ineligible to run for President.223 When
Gbagbo refused to allow Ouattara to run, there was new violence.
This time, however, it appeared to be more a result of ethnic strife
between the north and south than mere political struggle.224
During this conflict, immigrants and northerners were targeted at
unprecedented levels due to their supposed support for Ouattara.225
By the time the next parliamentary elections were held, there was
only a thirty percent participation rate.226
Due to the political instability, international aid stopped in
1999 and was only haltingly reinstated by 2001.227 All of this
political turmoil sent foreigners on the move again, including
refugees.228 Many thousands returned to their homes, "while
others have moved on to safer places within C6te d'Ivoire.
'2 29
1. Rights Taken Away During the Years of Xenophobia
"I left Liberia in 1993 because I was attacked by Charles
Directorate, supra note 216.
219 U.S. Dep't. of State, C6te d'Ivoire: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices-2003 (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27723.htm
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of State 2000].
220 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 17.
221 See Immigration and Nationality Directorate, supra note 216.
222 See id.
223 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 17.
224 See id. "There were several weeks of violence largely between northerners and
southerners. Churches and mosques were destroyed and many people were killed."
Immigration and Nationality Directorate, supra note 216.
225 See INT'L CRISIS GROUP No. 72, supra note 193, at 7.
226 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 17.
227 See id.
228 See id.
229 Id.
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Taylor's rebels. I was taken to jail, tied up, hung upside down,
and hot peppers were stuck in my mouth. They burned
cigarettes into my back and put hot coals on my private parts. I
escaped with much difficulty and ran to the Ivory Coast. My
story is just one; there are many of us here that cannot go back
to Liberia. But I cannot stay here either."
-A Liberian refugee in Cte d'Ivoire230
"Liberians increasingly feel that they would rather take their
chances, and possibly die in Liberia, than stay among friends
who have become strangers, and be killed in CMte d'lvoire."
-Amnesty International Interview with a Liberian refugee in
Cte d'Ivoire"3'
C6te d'Ivoire subscribed to the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol, but it has not incorporated the international obligations
into its own domestic law.232 The only domestic statute to deal
with refugees at all is the 1990 immigration law, which includes
refugees but does not denote a specific legal status for them. 3
Remember that when refugees first began their flight into C6te
d'Ivoire from Liberia in 1989, they were all accepted as refugees
on a prima facie basis. 4  Since 1999, one applies for refugee
status on an individual basis. 5  The decision to grant or deny
refugee status is left to committees represented by both UNHCR
and government officials236 called Commissions of Agreement
found within the ZAR.2 37  There is also a National Eligibility
Commission that handles asylum applications located in
Abidjan.2 8 The Commission of Agreement enters the person's
230 Refugees International.org, Liberian Refugees Threatened in the Ivory Coast,
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/846/.
231 Amnesty International, NO ESCAPE: Liberian Refugees in CMte d'Ivoire (Jun.
24, 2003), http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR310122003?open&of=ENG-
CIV.
232 KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 23-24; see also U.S. Dep't of State 2000, supra
note 219.
233 U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, I COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1999 148 (2000).
234 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 22; see also discussion supra Sec. IV.B.1.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 22 n.6.
238 See id.
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refugee status into a database,23 9 and the Ministry of the Interior
issues the refugee an identity card.24 °
This issuance of identity cards made specifically for refugees
did not occur until 1999; until that time, security officials often did
not honor identity documents issued to refugees by the UNHCR.24'
When security officials stopped refugees to ask for identity
documents and only received a UNHCR document, the officials
usually demanded money, destroyed refugees' identity documents,
detained refugees, and on occasion beat them.
242
On 25 December 2002, I left the centre as I had been invited to
spend Christmas with friends in the city. At a checkpoint, the
minibus I was traveling in with my family was stopped. I was
taken aside because my UNHCR-issued identity card showed I
was Liberian. I was made to undress, was beaten on the back,
and had the sum of 25,000 CFA (about [thirty-eight] Euros)
taken from me. My UNHCR card was then ripped up in front of
me, I was given my clothing back, and sent on my way. Anti-
Liberian insults were shouted at me the whole time.243
The refugee identity card conferred most of the rights attached
to the carte de sjour, the residence permit required pre-1999.
However, despite efforts by UNHCR, the refugee identity card
was not the equivalent of the carte de sjour.2' The most glaring
difference is that the refugee identity card was valid only within
the ZAR. 245 The refugee identity card did not allow a refugee to
open a bank account and was not valid to allow a refugee to get a
driver's license.246 It included a photo and had to be renewed
annually. 247 The administrative burdens of this annual renewal, as
well as other factors, required the suspension of new refugee
239 See id. at 22.
240 See UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL 2001 102 (2001), http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?id=3e2c05c 1 d&tbl=PUBL.
241 See U.S. Dep't of State 2000, supra note 219.
242 Id.
243 Amnesty International, supra note 231, at 11.
244 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 22-23.
245 See id.
246 See id. at 23.
247 See id.
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identity cards since 2000.248 Now many refugees do not have the
identity cards at all, nor any of the rights associated with them.249
In Danane, for example, at the time the refugee population reached
40,000, there were only 4,000 refugees who had refugee identity
cards. 250 Even in the year that cards were issued more liberally
(from 1999-2000), holders of resident cards and northerners were
viewed with suspicion by police; due to that, they were
systematically harassed and humiliated.25" '
Aside from these general issues of formal refugee legal status
and identity, the various refugee rights associated with the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol should be considered in view of
the political and legal changes in CMte d'Ivoire during the mid-
1990s. What is a life without the ability to work in dignity? Since
most refugees work in agrarian occupations, the most specific
change to the refugees' right to work occurred with the inception
of a new land law adopted in 1998.252 It adopted the government
view of Ivoirit, making land ownership a right only for Ivoirian
nationals.253 The old theory that land should go to whoever could
put it to use died with the new land law. Thus, even if refugees
can still move freely by law within the ZAR (which is highly
uncertain), their right to work is significantly hampered by a land
law that requires Ivoirian nationality for all land owners. When a
lifelong politician like Ouattara is not allowed to run for President
because one of his parents may be from Burkina Faso, how much
more suspicious does a refugee seem in terms of xenophobia? The
prospect for refugee ownership of land-and thus a career in
concentrated agriculture-no longer exists in CMte d'Ivoire. As
for the educated workers, their Liberian diplomas are not
recognized, their knowledge of French is insufficient for high-
level jobs, and they are not allowed employment in the public
sector.254
Even if the right to work had remained exactly the same as it
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 23.
251 See INT'L CRISIS GROUP No. 72, supra note 193, at 7.
252 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 22.
253 See Id.
254 See id. at 29.
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was at the time when Liberian refugees first arrived in C6te
d'Ivoire, the ability to travel to work has changed considerably.
On one hand, this change is part of a governmental decree; on the
other, it is the effect of ethnic xenophobia within the general
populace.
In order to leave the ZAR, a refugee must apply for a travel
permit;255 this was true even as early as 1990 when most refugees
first began crossing borders. When refugees initially arrived and
they still had an explicit invitation to the country, the government
did not back xenophobia. Even though there were laws that did
make travel outside the ZAR somewhat difficult in terms of
convenience, refugees could still travel.
Today, however, the intensity of travel restrictions has greatly
increased due to ethnic sentiment and hatred for foreigners.256
While the travel laws have not significantly changed on the books
since the beginning of the refugee influx, the horrors of roadblocks
have created a de facto halt to travel rights.
Since the 1999 coup, harassment, enforced bribes, arbitrary
arrest, and beatings are frequent at roadblocks. 257 "[U]niformed
police, gendarmes, and water, forestry, and customs officials
commonly erect and operate roadblocks on major roads, where
they demand that passing motorists or passengers produce identity
and vehicle papers and regularly extort small amounts of money or
goods for contrived or minor infractions.,, 258 This is true of any
foreigner, but it is especially true of refugees due to the
aforementioned problems with identity documents. Indeed,
Ivoirian police officers consider any form of refugee identity card
invalid.25 9 This is partly due to the concept of Ivoiritd.26° Even
without a specific legal change, travel has changed dramatically
for refugees since government officials and their ethnically
motivated hatred is not kept at bay.
While the rights to travel and work are crucial for adults, the
right to education is crucial for children. Some of the Liberian
255 See id. at 23.
256 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 24.
257 See id.
258 U.S. Dep't of State 2000, supra note 219, at 11.
259 See UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL, supra note 240, at 102.
260 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 16; see also discussion supra Section IV.C.
2005]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
children have spent their entire childhoods in C6te d'Ivoire, and
the ability to receive education is of utmost importance. Cfte
d'Ivoire wanted the Liberian refugee children to be fully
integrated into Ivoirian schools from 1989 to 1990.26' However,
UNHCR thought that the refugee children should learn English
rather than French since UNHCR continued to primarily support
the goal of repatriation.
Education for Liberian children worsened once the economy
crumbled and widespread political strife began in the late 1990s as
foreign aid ran out. In 1999, with these budgetary losses, the
education program created and run by Liberian refugees within the
ZAR needed to scale down.262 In order to accommodate the
necessity of an education program, refugee children sought to
integrate into Ivoirian schools. 263  The Minister of Education
objected to this in 1999.264 In addition to declaring a shortage of
classrooms, he suggested that Liberian children would have
difficulty with French and noted the lack of Ivoirian teachers to
teach the children. 265
At this point, UNHCR decided on a transitional year where
primary school children would remain in refugee schools, but
would change to the Ivoirian curriculum and use Ivoirian
teachers.266 UNHCR also began to seek funding to build extra
classrooms in Ivoirian schools.267  All support to secondary
schools was stopped. 268 As of 2003, Liberian children were still
not integrated into Ivoirian schools, and former Liberian teachers
were dissatisfied with being forced out of work.
The situation is not without hope. After another transitional
year was undertaken, the Ministry of Education eventually agreed
to accept all those enrolled in the refugee schools.269 Ivoirian
authorities even extended the age requirements for each grade by
261 See id. at 30; see also discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
262 See id. at 31.
263 See id.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See KUH-LMAN, supra note 127, at 31.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 See id.
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two years in order to accommodate refugee children who were
older than their Ivoirian classmates.27 °
It appears that in terms of education inadequacies, UNHCR is
more to blame than the Ivoirian government. Since UNHCR did
not seize the chance to integrate the Liberian refugee children with
the Ivoirian children, the opportunity was lost. Of course,
Liberian parental discretion played an important role, and it could
be that the refugee children would have been harmed had they
been integrated so closely with Ivoirian children during the
ensuing wars. However, that is beyond the scope of this paper.
For the current purposes, it is enough to note that C6te d'Ivoire
was at first willing to integrate and give more rights than were
required by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and UNHCR
did not take the Ivoirian government up on its offer.
D. Consequences of Losing Rights
Since the situation of Liberian refugees has deteriorated, their
loss of rights has not gone unnoticed. Due to the property losses
of refugee adults, there has been an increased need to move further
and wider to find work, or they have had to remain in a camp
without work. In either case, parents are not present-physically
or mentally, in some cases-to the same degree that they were
when their rights were granted. This has made recruitment of their
children into guerrilla and regular armies easier.27' Indeed,
children as young as nine years old have been recruited and have
been seen fighting with machine guns.272
Furthermore, the government-sponsored violence has
dispersed the labor force throughout C6te d'Ivoire such that a
"disruption of planting and harvesting-even for a short time-
[will] deal a severe blow to a major pillar of West Africa's
economy., 273 While the regional economy struggles due to lost
rights, guerrillas get richer. This is because both the refugee camp
structure and financial aid benefit guerrillas in their effort to gain
270 See id.
271 See generally CHILD SOLDIER USE 2003: A BRIEFING FOR THE 4TH UN SECURITY
COUNCIL OPEN DEBATE ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT (2001), http://www.child-
soldiers.org/documentget.php?id=692.
272 Id.
273 Ivory Coast, supra note 202.
20051
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
political control over civilians.274
This comment is not meant to be exhaustive, and is only
provided to give a brief glimpse into the catastrophe that arises
from the violations of rights and the cycle of war. If stop-gap
measures and mechanisms were implemented to take control of
these problems before they spiraled out of control, not only would
refugees be safer, but so would whole international regions.
V. How Can the World Stop Refugee Warehousing?
"Sometimes we must interfere. When human lives are
endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national
borders and sensitivities become irrelevant. Wherever men and
women are persecuted because of their race, religion or
political views, that place must, at that moment, become the
center of the universe."
-Elie Wiesel
275
The problem that prompted the 1951 Convention is still
materializing all over the world. Genocide and ethnic wars are not
extinct. The world hoped that the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol would help solve the problems facing refugees when they
were forced to leave home; yet, it is clear there is still a grave
dilemma. By considering the rights arising from the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol and their affects in C6te d'Ivoire, it
is apparent that international law does not solve the catastrophe of
refugee warehousing. Even when a country like C6te d'Ivoire
meets many of the minimal requirements of the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol, refugees may still suffer greatly if the
country's sentiment (not necessarily law) changes-in this case, to
one of ethnic hatred and a disdain for all foreigners.
The world needs to consider what has gone wrong in global
refugee policy and what can be done better. After reviewing C6te
d'Ivoire, it appears that three factors should be taken into
consideration when conceiving of solutions to refugee
warehousing.
The first step toward a solution requires that domestic law
274 See FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO REPEAT? THE PARADOX OF HUMANITARIAN
ACTION 8 (2002).
275 Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1986),
www.eliewieselfoundation.org/ElieWiesel/speech.html.
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encompass current norms of international law. C6te d'Ivoire
demonstrated that when a country's domestic law upholds
international obligations, there is a greater chance that those
obligations will be enforced. However, even in cases where C6te
d'Ivoire's own law granted the rights established by the 1951
Convention-in the case of travel, for instance-the country's
ethnic hatred practically prevented granting those rights. Any
solution, therefore, ought to consider not only integration of
international law into the domestic law arena, but also how to
foster the correct climate so that the spirit of such international
norms is upheld.
Second, any solution must consider the role of international
law once refugees are displaced as well as to gauge how the world
should respond to trouble spots before they erupt into violence.
For instance, there would have been no refugee crisis if the
situation in Liberia had been more seriously intercepted by the
international community before it spiraled out of control in 1989.
Third, an immediate integration of refugees into the host
country should be first and foremost among the durable solutions.
The problem of warehousing cannot end, even if the minimal 1951
Convention rights are upheld, unless refugees have the ability to
integrate into the local community. To remain in camps appears to
be a per se violation of the spirit and rights granted by the 1951
Convention.
With these three considerations in mind, this paper turns to
consider the roles of the international community and of the
UNHCR.
A. The International Community's Role
"We must choose carefully how we treat the stranger among us,
because our choice has serious implications for the stranger, but
also for ourselves."
-Savitri Taylor
276
1. Stop Crises Before They Begin
"[T]he international community must place a greater emphasis
on the underlying causes of the refugee problem through a
276 Savitri Taylor, Quotable Quotes, UNIYA, Jesuit Social Justice Center,
http://www.uniya.org/education/refugees-quotes.html.
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preventative policy," as well as on intervention. 77 States must
understand that emergencies which produce hundreds of thousands
of refugees flooding across borders do not typically happen
suddenly.2 78 They are the culmination of ethnic hatred, a lack of
access to participation in the political process, or a violent demand
for great change.279 Since most crises that produce refugees are
not sudden, the world needs to identify the root causes of potential
mass refugee influx and then find a way to intervene.28 ° That
intervention can neither be strictly monetary, nor can it be limited
to signing a ceasefire agreement or peace accord.28' In the case of
CMte d'Ivoire, the restriction of foreign aid in 1999 was
catastrophic. It not only hurt the country in general, but it also
severely impacted the Liberian refugees as well. 28 2 When aid was
most needed, UNHCR and developmental funding to C6te
d'Ivoire plummeted. Thus, intervention should be established in
ways aside from merely imposing sanctions or withholding aid.
Some put the onus of intervention on UNCHR since there is a
mandate for states to cooperate with UNHCR. For years, UNHCR
has tried to intervene in struggles by working with guerrilla forces
and discussing solutions with recognized governments.283
Nevertheless, this work has been undertaken without any legal
basis.284 If UNHCR continues to work in this way, its training and
mandate must be changed.285 A better fit would be for UNHCR to
continue its role as an apolitical body primarily used to support
277 GIL LOESCHER & ANN DULL LOESCHER, THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 15 (1994).
278 See EGGLI, supra note 150, at 24.
279 See id.
280 See ELIZABETH G. FERRIS, BEYOND BORDERS: REFUGEES, MIGRANTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 88 (1993).
281 See id. at 89.
282 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 4, 31. For instance, since the shortage of
funds beginning in 1999, severe cuts have been made in terms of equipment and teaching
materials for vocational schools. Teachers are forced to explain how a particular
machine might work, since there is no money to have the actual machine there as a
model. Further, with the depletion of money, food programs in schools have been cut,
resulting in a much lower rate of school attendance. See id.
283 See LOESCHER, supra note 277, at 15.
284 See id.
285 See id.
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refugees while assigning the intervention and prevention tasks to
other bodies. Tactics should include: mediation, peace making,
peace keeping, and peace building efforts. These tactics should be
undertaken by the UN, by regional organizations, and "by States
which have an economic and political influence in the countries
where conflicts are taking place.,
286
"[T]here is a tension or conflict between human rights
protection on the one hand, and control of one's borders,
sovereignty and economic globalization, on the other., 287  In
addition, "Article 2 of the UN Charter prohibits the UN from
intervening in matters that fall essentially within the domesticjurisdiction of any state.88 If internal struggles spill over into
neighboring countries or significantly affect them, however, the
struggles may be considered grievous human rights abuses and fall
outside the realm of the strictly internal.289 "In contractual terms,
to produce refugees can be viewed as a result of state misconduct
violating either rules of generic international law or specific
treaty-based obligations vis-A-vis other states. From this general
perspective, states are not allowed to inflict losses or damages on
other countries without liability. '290 However, to become involved
with most mass refugee circumstances seems not a breach of state
sovereignty, but a necessity. While preventing refugee abuses
depends on overcoming barriers of national sovereignty, no
international organization has been able to do this consistently.29'
It is also difficult to acquire international political support for
armed intervention efforts.292 States do not easily commit their
soldiers to UN missions because they are perceived as too far
away and too irrelevant to warrant involvement.293 With this in
mind, it is important that the world monitor nations for signs of
strife via a new body-not UNHCR-and become involved in
286 CRISP, supra note 57, at 21.
287 THE REFUGEES CONVENTION 50 YEARS ON: GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 9 (2003) [hereinafter REFUGEES CONVENTION].
288 LOESCHER, supra note 33, at 182.
289 See id. at 183; see also EGGLI, supra note 150, at 41.
290 EGGLI, supra note 150, at 41.
291 LOESCHER, supra note 33, at 150.
292 See id. at 181-82.
293 See id.
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resolving problems early. Prevention trumps intervention, but
intervention should be used as a final resort.
Finally, nations which host refugees should be developed to
play a major role in the prevention of rights abuses. Instead of
emphasizing assistance in the short-term (in camps), aid should be
given with the long-term development of host countries in mind
(in terms of infrastructure and roads). 294 Refugees should be a part
of the long-term development plans because they bring new ideas,
a different educational background, and time to the host country.
They turn abandoned land into villages and farms, and they can
add to the host country's economy. 95
The developmental aspect of prevention and intervention can
be secured with pre-existing channels like non-governmental
organizations and the UN, but the key area for change is
programmatic. 291 Insofar as programming and the approval and
placement of funds are concerned, developmental and
humanitarian aid should operate in the same fashion. "In Africa,
for example, researchers estimate that no more than 25% percent
of the continent's refugees live in settlements or camps. 297
Despite this, aid programs are geared at camps and are not often
aimed at helping the host country.298 This leaves refugees who are
able to successfully integrate completely on their own; while
refugees who give up many of their rights and move into camps
might be fed, they will have minimal or no personal freedom. If
more aid was put into the development of host countries in areas
impacted by large swells of refugees (for example, school building
and staffing, farming aid, and environmental rebuilding efforts),
then more refugees could integrate and be seen as a positive force
rather than a burden.
As long as C6te d'Ivoire held up its end of the bargain under
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and as long as the
country remained relatively stable, money was easier to receive.
2 99
For instance, in 1989 when the Liberian refugees began flowing
294 See id.
295 See id. at 173.
296 See id. at 175.
297 LOESCHER 1993, supra note 33, at 172.
298 See id. at 172-73.
299 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 25.
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over the border, UNHCR immediately began to receive funds. °0
By March of 1990, Emergency Fund monies were given, and the
High Commissioner pleaded to donors to give more.30 ' In 1990,
UNHCR spent 5.9 million U.S. dollars.30 2 By 1995 that amount
increased to 12.2 million U.S. dollars, and by 1998, UNHCR spent
15.5 million dollars. 303  However, from 1999 until today the
amount of money has steadily declined.
2. Reform the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
"[I]mplementation and interpretation of the Refugees
Convention by some governments infringes basic human rights
when the will to adhere to the spirit of the Convention is
lacking.''3° Even so, not all of the problems associated with the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol are due to interpretation. The
foremost problem seems to be the stick by which most refugee
rights are measured-that of the "alien" instead of the
"refugee."305
Generally, under the provisions of the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol, refugees are granted rights and protected to the
same extent as other noncitizens in the host country.30 6 This, in
turn, begs the question in every refugee crisis: How does this
particular host country generally treat noncitizens? In C6te
d'Ivoire, this was the sticking point.
Even when the C6te d'Ivoirian government changed
leadership, Ivoirit, was implemented, and the laws were changed;
some of the refugee rights were actually not technically breached.
For instance, since the domestic laws in C6te d'Ivoire took land
rights away from all foreigners, refugees were legally included.3"7
Refugees were considered noncitizens, and as such, they had no
more right to land according to Ivoirian law than a worker from
300 See id. at 25 tbl.5.
301 See id. at 25.
302 See id. at 25 tbl.5.
303 See id.
304 REFUGEES CONVENTION, supra note 287, at 9.
305 See 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 2.
306 See id.
307 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 22.
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Burkina Faso.30 8
The only way to protect refugees, as a group, is to reform the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol to define refugees as entirely
separate and distinct from noncitizens. This would keep a
consistent level of treatment for refugees regardless of how a
particular country decides to treat noncitizens.
3. Enforce the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
Many argue that international cooperation is only a consensual
theory, and there are no mandatory legal repercussions in cases of
noncompliance.30 9 Public international law points to a pattern of
states' disinclination to be legally duty-bound to cooperate with
the treaties they sign.3 °  While states do have an explicit
obligation to cooperate with the UNHCR via Article 35 of the
1951 Convention and Article 2 of the 1967 Protocol, these are not
perceived as legal obligations.3 ' If there is no legal obligation to
comply with general public international law and there is an
obligation for states to cooperate with UNHCR, the focus must be
on one of two choices.
First, changes should focus on reforming the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol to create a legal obligation for its signatory
states. In the case of C6te d'Ivoire, this would mean that no
matter who was President and no matter how tense ethnic hatred
became among the general population, the country would still
have been obligated to uphold refugees' rights by virtue of signing
the treaty.
Second, changes should focus on giving teeth to the obligation
to cooperate with UNHCR. "Cooperation with UNHCR" must
mean more than merely allowing it to work in a host country or to
308 See 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 2.
309 See EGGLI, supra note 150, at 29.
310 See id. at 54.
311 "The Contracting States undertake to cooperate with the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees .... and shall in particular facilitate its duty
of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention . . . . [T]he
Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information
and statistical data requested concerning: (a) the condition of refugees, (b) the
implementation of this Convention, and (c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or
my hereafter be, in force in relation to refugees." See 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at
art. 35(1), (2).
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provide statistical data. UNHCR should be able to demand more
of countries in order to keep them in compliance with international
law.
4. Promote Self-Reliance
The international community should promote the principle of
refugee self-reliance while waiting for the possibility to
voluntarily repatriate.312 This would improve the quality of life for
refugees and give them a new degree of dignity and security. It
would enable refugees to make a contribution to the economy of
the host country and make their presence a boon, rather than a
burden. It would enable UNHCR and its donors to withdraw from
costly care and maintenance programs, which only enable refugees
to survive at the level of basic sustenance.313 Instead, money
would be placed into development, as mentioned above, with the
goal of creating an environment that will promote refugee self-
reliance.
B. UNHCR's Role
"[Refugees] often arrive in exile without shoes, with only one
torn shirt, hungry, without a clear plan. But they did not
undergo this experience in order to get a shirt or shoes."
-Mark Raper SJ3 1
4
1. Focus on Integration From Day One
During the 1980s, the UNHCR was primarily concerned with
satisfying the most basic and pressing needs of encamped
refugees. In the 1990s, it became very monetarily bogged down in
providing emergency assistance to refugees during internal
wars.3"5 Due to these expenditures, UNHCR's resources have
dwindled, "and it has also made achieving the traditional 'durable'
solutions ... increasingly difficult."'31 6 These difficulties resulted
in a greater concentration of refugees in the camps because it was
312 See CRISP, supra note 57, at 22.
313 See id.
314 Mark Raper SJ, Quotable Quotes, UNIYA, Jesuit Social Justice Center,
http://www.uniya.org/education/refugees-quotes.html.
315 See LOESCHER, supra note 33, at 148.
316 Id.
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the simplest way to provide short-term aid.317 Today, local
integration is not even seen as a priority among the three best-
known durable solutions. Instead, refugees typically end up
staying in long-term camps in the first country of asylum.318 By
abandoning integration, host and donor countries and the UNHCR
instead have chosen long-term care and maintenance programs.319
The lack of focus on integration during the past fifteen years
has been considered by some as a link to the high proportion of
warehoused refugee situations in Africa. "Indeed[,] from the mid-
1980s onwards, a consensus was forged around the notion that
repatriation-normally, but not necessarily, on a voluntary basis-
was the only viable solution to refugee problems in Africa and
other low-income regions. '3 20  This is certainly true of CMte
d'Ivoire.
From the beginning of the refugee influx in CMte d'Ivoire in
1989, UNHCR approached the problem believing that the refugees
would only stay for a limited time.32' As early as 1991 UNHCR
was working on a plan for voluntary repatriation.3 2  In 1992,
UNCHR was still preparing to send refugees back to Liberia for
voluntary repatriation.323 In fact, every UNHCR annual report
shows fresh hope that the peace process in Liberia will work and
the refugees will be able to return.324 It was not until 1997 "that
major repatriation could be undertaken, and even then.., it had to
be suspended when violence broke out again ... ... UNHCR's
2001 Global Appeal still refers to refugee repatriation as the
imminent goal: "By the end of 2001 refugees wishing to repatriate
will have returned to their country of origin with UNHCR's
assistance. Refugees remaining in CMte d'Ivoire will have attained
317 See BOOKMAN, supra note 65, at 209; see also U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra
note 3, at 48. Local Settlement as a Percentage of UNHCR Total Expenditure and
Number of Refugees Worldwide-1976-2002.
318 See EGGLI, supra note 150, at 101.
319 See CRISP, supra note 57, at 3.
320 See id. at 2.
321 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 26.
322 See id.
323 See id.
324 See id.
325 See id.
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a reasonable degree of integration. 3 26  It is clear that UNHCR
responded to the situation with an eye toward a temporary fix.
Instead of a temporary situation, however, some refugees have
only now returned home in January 2005. This means that there
have been hundreds of thousands of refugees living in C6te
d'Ivoire for over fifteen years.327
While talk began in 1992 of transitioning from goals of care
and maintenance to self-sufficiency of refugees, it was not until
1999 when funds were critically reduced that self-sufficiency
programs underwent any kind of serious change.328 Still, the
overwhelming portion of UNHCR's budget is spent on care and
maintenance. In 2003, care and maintenance accounted for $147
million of the total U.S. State Department spending on refugee
assistance, while integration accounted for only $480,000.329
In terms of prevention, integration prepares refugees for their
future repatriation much better than encampment. "Experience
shows that refugees who have led a productive life in exile,
received an education, developed practical skills, and accumulated
some resources may actually be better prepared and equipped to
go home and contribute to the reconstruction of their country than
those who have languished in camps for years, surviving on
minimal levels of humanitarian assistance.,
331
The UNHCR could change in many of the ways listed above in
terms of the modified mandate, training, and the like. The most
important change that UNHCR could make, however, is to
structure its programming and funding requests to reflect a
primary goal toward integration. From the very beginning of a
326 See UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL, supra note 240.
327 See Francesca Fontanini, Liberian Refugees Start Coming Home from COte
d'Ivoire, UNCHR, Jan. 12, 2005, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc
.htm?tbl=NEWS&page=home&id=41e55d344.
328 See KUHLMAN, supra note 127, at 26.
329 See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 49 fig.2003 U.S. State Dep't
Spending on Refugee Assistance by Category. Emergency assistance equaled $238
million; repatriation/reintegration equaled $101 million; and resettlement equaled $126
million. Id.
330 CRISP, supra note 57, at 22. Crisp points to the Ukwimi camp for Mozambican
refugees in Zambia. "While the refugees were able to attain a high degree of self-
reliance in the camp, they returned to their own country almost immediately, once it
became safe to do so." Id.
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refugee crisis, refugees should be urged to and supported in their
right to work, travel, and integrate freely.331
VI. Conclusion
The overarching theme of this paper is that free human beings
are successful human beings. While it might be easier to crowd
people into a camp and then feed and shelter them as if they were
imprisoned, it is not the humanitarian thing to do. It is useless to
draft treaties and meet quarterly to discuss progress when the very
purpose of the treaty is not coming to fruition. The world must
find a way to look at refugees as strong individuals with talents
and potential. They must be seen as creative and able. They must
be viewed truly as "brothers [and sisters] in distress, ' ' 32 and we
must come to their aid and allow them to enrich our own
countries.
There is no way to create this effect without a multi-pronged
attack via international law, developmental funding, domestic law,
reform of the appropriate treaties, and a new attitude toward
integration. Without these, the world's refugees will continue to
suffer, and humanity will continue to lose the talents of millions of
brave, strong, and courageous people.
TRACI L. MASSEY
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